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Lightweight Formal Methods for Improving Software Security
University of Northern Iowa
Dr. Andrew Berns, James Curbow, Joshua Hilliard, Sheriff Jorkeh, Miho Sanders
Introduction
Software plays an increasing role in managing the
responsibilities of many areas in society. As we’ve
continued to cede more responsibility to software, the
potential damage done from insecure software has grown.
It is not hard to find examples of security breaches that
have resulted in major financial losses and personal
hardships for consumers.

Methods
• Step 1: Select a vulnerability in an open-source product.

• Step 2: Identify the incorrect code and the corresponding fix.

Lessons Learned
Retrofitting is still hard.
While the tools for static analysis with formal methods
have improved in the past few years, it is still not easy to
take a project which has not used formal methods and
retrofit the code to work with current tools. This is often
given as one of the main reasons why formal methods
have not gained widespread acceptance for cybersecurity
[2].
More annotations would be helpful.
Today’s static analysis tools can only check a subset of
possible operations. Some of the annotations that have
yet to be implemented, such as whether or not a
particular variable is assigned a value inside a method,
have only limited support. If these annotations were
checkable, it might improve the success rate for detecting
vulnerabilities.

Future Work
While formal methods have gained popularity in safetycritical systems, they are much less common in other
categories of software. Formal methods can help create
better software, however, which would also be more
secure. “Half of cyber vulnerabilities are software defects
and the cost of avoiding and mitigating software errors
approaches $100B annually.” [1] Our project hopes to
help bring formal methods to more types of software.

• Step 3: Create annotations which might identify the error.

We are continuing to add to our dataset of software
vulnerability corrections and annotations for these
corrections.
As the data set grows, we will be better able to identify
the best practices for using formal methods to improve
computer security.
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• Step 4: Test which annotations, if any, actually identify the error.

Measure the effectiveness of modern static analysis
tools
at
identifying,
with
programmer-defined
annotations, security vulnerabilities.
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